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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in
American law and practice than one would gather from reading
judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for
and against judicial supremacy. Lower federal court judges, state
court justices, federal and state elected officials, persons charged
with administering the law, and ordinary citizens often have the
final say on particular constitutional controversies or exercise
temporary constitutional authority in ways that have more influence
on the parties to that controversy than the eventual Supreme Court
decision. In many instances, Supreme Court doctrine sanctions or
facilitates the exercise of independent constitutional authority by
persons other than Supreme Court Justices. Inflated claims about
the role of the Supreme Court in American constitutional politics
ignore significant institutional, legal, and political constraints on
judicial power, conflate the judicial power to have the final say over
the meaning of constitutional provisions with the judicial power to
settle constitutional controversies at particular times and places, and
confuse independent constitutional authority with nullification.
* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Much thanks to Jack
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INTRODUCTION
Proponents and opponents of judicial supremacy routinely
assume that the Supreme Court settles (almost) all constitutional
controversies that excite Americans. Law professors and students
of public law ritually chant Tocqueville’s catechism that “[s]carcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”1 Participants in
the debate over the proper allocation of constitutional authority
dispute whether an imperial judiciary with the power to resolve
(almost) all constitutional disputes is desirable, but not whether the
United States actually has an imperial judiciary with the power to
resolve (almost) all constitutional disputes. Professor Larry Kramer,
a proponent of popular constitutionalism, complains that “everyone
nowadays seems willing to accept the [Supreme] Court’s word as
final ... regardless of the issue, regardless of what the Justices say,
and regardless of the Court’s political complexion.”2 Professor
Ronald Dworkin, a more enthusiastic proponent of judicial suprem-
acy, maintained that “practice has now settled” that “courts should
take final authority to interpret the Constitution.”3 Claims of a
“judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation”4 find substan-
tial historical support in Professor Keith Whittington’s study of
American constitutional development.5 He concludes, “institutional
and coalitional pressures that push political actors to turn to the
Court for constitutional leadership have become more pervasive
over the course of American history. Political leaders have found
increasing reason to support the Court, and decreasing capacity to
resist the Court, over time.”6
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
2. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 228 (2004).
3. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 12 (1996).
4. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 960
(2004).
5. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 232 (2007).
6. Id.
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Supreme Court opinions, often supported by executive pronounce-
ments, embrace this all-encompassing power to settle constitutional
conflicts by claiming responsibility for every constitutional nook and
cranny. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion in Ableman v. Booth
stated: 
It was essential, therefore, to its very existence as a Government
... that a tribunal should be established in which all cases which
might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the
United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United
States, should be finally and conclusively decided.7
One hundred years later, every Justice on the Supreme Court
signed Chief Justice Earl Warren’s assertion in Cooper v. Aaron that
the Justices had the final say in all controversies over the meaning
and application of constitutional provisions.8 Warren’s unanimous
opinion asserted:
In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous
Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of
Marbury v. Madison that “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and
the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system.... 
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war
against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court
in saying that: “If the legislatures of the several states may, at
will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitu-
tion itself becomes a solemn mockery.”9
7. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 518 (1858).
8. See 358 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
9. Id. at 18 (citation omitted) (first quoting 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); and then
quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809)).
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During the Little Rock Crisis, President Eisenhower firmly defend-
ed the Supreme Court as the final arbiter for all constitutional
controversies.10 He declared, “[t]he very basis of our individual
rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President ...
will support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the
Federal Courts.”11
Justices on the contemporary Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are
particularly prone to insist on judicial supremacy over the entire
American constitutional universe.12 Professor Kramer observes that
the Supreme Court’s “new jurisprudence rests explicitly on a claim
that it is judges who are ultimately responsible for interpreting the
Constitution and that this means the whole Constitution.”13 Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in United States v. Morrison asserted,
“ever since Marbury [v. Madison] this Court has remained the
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”14 “When the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution already issued,” Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores stated, “it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court
will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must
be disappointed.”15 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, the plurality opinion suggested that constitutional
debate outside the Court must cease when the Supreme Court
speaks clearly and decisively on a constitutional issue.16 Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter spoke of “the Court’s interpretation
of the Constitution call[ing] the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.”17
10. See Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little
Rock, PUB. PAPERS 689, 690 (Sept. 24, 1957).
11. Id. at 692
12. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241 (2002) (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s view in recent years [is] that it alone among the three branches has been
allocated the power to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional provisions.”).
13. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 225.
14. 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
15. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
16. 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992).
17. Id. at 867.
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Closer examination reveals that the Supreme Court exercises far
less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one
would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches,
or the standard tomes for and against judicial supremacy. Lower
federal court judges, state court justices, federal and state elected
officials, persons charged with administering the law, and ordinary
citizens often have the final say on particular constitutional contro-
versies18 or exercise temporary constitutional authority in ways that
have more influence on the parties to that controversy than the
eventual Supreme Court decision.19 In many instances, Supreme
Court doctrine sanctions or facilitates the exercise of independent
constitutional authority by persons other than Supreme Court
Justices.20 Inflated claims about the role of the Supreme Court in
American constitutional politics ignore significant institutional, le-
gal, and political constraints on judicial power, conflate the judicial
power to have the final say over the meaning of constitutional
provisions with the judicial power to settle constitutional controver-
sies at particular times and places, and confuse independent
constitutional authority with nullification.
Established Supreme Court doctrine frequently vests independent
constitutional authority in persons other than Supreme Court
Justices. The political question doctrine vests Congress and the
President with the power to settle important constitutional dis-
putes. Concrete judicial review vests persons outside the Supreme
Court with temporary constitutional authority, often for extended
periods of time, to provide provisional settlements for constitutional
disputes. Elected officials, state judges, and ordinary citizens may
reject Supreme Court doctrines when making constitutional deci-
sions, as long as they do not act in ways forbidden by existing
18. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 707, 716 (1985) (“Congressional and executive practices over a number of years can be
instrumental in fixing the meaning of the Constitution.”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 115 (“Practice thus establishes that the polit-
ical branches at times provide a necessary source of interpretation in the absence of judicial
resolution and a valuable alternative or supplemental voice when the Court has spoken.”).
19. Mark A. Graber, Almost Legal: Disobedience and Partial Nullification in American
Constitutional Politics and Law, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITU-
TIONAL THOUGHT 146, 168 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016).
20. See, e.g., Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 409-10 (2013).
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constitutional law.21 A governor who believes that capital punish-
ment violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments may pardon
all persons on the state’s death row, even when the Supreme Court
insists that the death penalty meets constitutional standards.22
President Andrew Jackson refused to follow McCulloch v. Maryland
when claiming the federal government had no power to incorporate
a national bank.23 Judicial deference to legislative and trial court
fact-finding enables governing officials to disregard judicial prece-
dents as long as they can plausibly describe the underlying circum-
stances in ways that make their conduct appear to be consistent
with constitutional norms.24 Police officers who know that trial
judges are likely to purport to believe their testimony that some
evidence was in plain view have the practical authority to determine
the constitutional justifications for their searches.25
Supreme Court Justices would face insuperable legal, institu-
tional, and political barriers should they actually attempt to secure
a “monopoly on constitutional interpretation.”26 The constitutional
text interpreted in light of long-standing precedents often mandates
judicial decisions allocating constitutional authority elsewhere. The
Justices have no legal power to punish jurors who disregard judicial
statements of the law. Printz v. United States forbids the Supreme
Court from correcting state governors who refuse to allow state
police to implement federal laws they believe are unconstitutional.27
The Supreme Court is incapable of learning about the vast majority
of constitutional decisions that are made every day in the United
States. Police officers patrolling the streets make numerous con-
stitutional decisions about when searches are appropriate that are
rarely reviewed by their superiors, much less appellate judges.28
21. See infra Part II.
22. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in
Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/citing-issue-of-
fairness-governor-clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html [https://perma.cc/Z2B6-QNUD].
23. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in
2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 582
(James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
24. See Graber, supra note 19, at 158-59.
25. See id. at 158.
26. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 960.
27. See 521 U.S. 898, 925-26, 935 (1997).
28. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(observing that many illegal searches never reach the courts); William J. Stuntz, The Political
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State and lower federal courts have various means for keeping con-
stitutional decisions beneath the Supreme Court’s radar. Further-
more, the Justices have limited political capital.29 The Supreme
Court during the Civil War found various jurisdictional exercises for
avoiding decisions on the constitutional status of legal tender and
presidential suspensions of habeas corpus.30 The Justices of the
Ellsworth and Marshall Courts made a strategic decision when
ruling that the Supreme Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction
only when doing so was consistent with both Article III and a
federal statute.31
Commentary that concentrates on which governing institution
“ultimately” has the final say over the meaning of the Constitution
misses important dimensions of constitutional law and practice.
Most constitutional decision makers have shorter time horizons and
are concerned with far narrower problems than the Supreme Court
of the United States or professors who write about judicial suprem-
acy. Police officers are very interested in who determines whether
the person they see loitering near a jewelry store may be constitu-
tionally stopped and frisked, less interested in who has the final say
over whether that stop and frisk meets constitutional standards,
and not at all interested in whether the Supreme Court hands down
a decision settling the relevant constitutional questions after they
are retired. Such police officers and many other government officials
exercise considerable independent constitutional authority in
particular times and places. This authority is sanctioned by the
Supreme Court and is often exercised in ways that settle constitu-
tional controversies.
We fail to appreciate the dispersal of independent constitutional
authority in the United States by erroneously equating the exercise
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 n.4 (2006) (noting the incalcu-
lable number of police searches and seizures conducted each year).
29. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 138-40
(1980).
30. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251-52 (1864) (habeas corpus);
Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512, 513, 517 (1863) (legal tender). See generally Mark
A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and
Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33 (Ronald
Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
31. See Graber, supra note 30, at 46-47.
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of independent constitutional authority with nullification.32 Persons
exercise independent constitutional authority when they act or for-
bear from acting on the basis of constitutional understandings other
than those promulgated by the Supreme Court. They may refrain
from exercising powers and rights that existing doctrine permits
them to exercise, or they may act or forebear from acting in ways
forbidden by the Supreme Court. Persons attempt nullification only
when they do the latter.33 The difference between independent con-
stitutional authority and nullification is most obvious in instances
when no Supreme Court decision exists. Before Obergefell v. Hodges,
governing officials had to exercise some independent judgment
when deciding whether same-sex couples had a constitutional right
to marry.34 Even when Supreme Court precedent exists, elected
officials, members of executive departments, and ordinary citizens
are often able to act constitutionally on the basis of their belief that
Justices have decided incorrectly without engaging in nullification.
State governors do not have to accept conditional federal funds
when they believe the underlying federal law is not sanctioned by
32. For one example of this confusion, see Ryan Card, Note, Can States “Just Say No” to
Federal Health Care Reform? The Constitutional and Political Implications of State Attempts
to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1795, 1799, 1811.
33. James Read and Neal Allen define nullification as the claim that a state “may
legitimately rule that any federal act ... is unconstitutional; and, most important, that it may
act on this judgment by blocking the implementation of that federal act within the state’s
boundaries.” James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and Undead: Nullification Past and
Present, 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 263, 268 (2012). My emphasis on actions forbidden by the
Supreme Court highlights how nullification consists of taking illegal action. States may on
the basis of independent constitutional authority take legal steps to block the implementation
of federal law. They may, for example, under Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997),
refuse to allow state officials to implement a federal law. See Read & Allen, supra, at 290-93.
34. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-97 (2015). Baker v. Nelson complicates this particular analogy.
191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (indicating that
the appeal from Minnesota’s highest court’s holding that the right to marry does not extend
to homosexual couples was “dismissed for want of substantial federal question” at the
Supreme Court). Arguably, there was a relevant constitutional precedent that other governing
officials could use to guide their conduct. Still, the lack of Supreme Court guidance on same-
sex marriage at least required governing officials to exercise independent judgment on
whether Baker v. Nelson had precedential value and, if so, whether that decision had been
undermined by more recent precedents on LGBT rights such as United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013) (holding that the exclusion of same-sex marriages from the federal
statutory definition of marriage was unconstitutional).
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Article I. Private persons may refrain from burning flags, because
they believe Texas v. Johnson35 was wrongly decided.
The following pages continue a project exploring how and in how
many ways contemporary constitutional law and practice allocate
independent constitutional authority outside the Supreme Court.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court does not have
the final say on every political controversy that arises in the United
States.36 Indeed, many constitutional controversies arise on which
the Supreme Court has no say.37 As important, this judicial inca-
pacity is often grounded in Supreme Court decisions that entail as
a matter of law or practice that various constitutional controversies
will be settled by other tribunals, other governing officials, or other
citizens.
A previous paper elaborated on how fact deference, jury nullifica-
tion, and temporary constitutional authority empower persons other
than Supreme Court Justices to settle constitutional controversies.38
Substantial fact deference occurs in American constitutional prac-
tice partly because American constitutional law mandates substan-
tial fact deference and partly because Supreme Court Justices have
“almost no capacity to supervise administrative, legislative, and
state and lower federal court fact-finding.”39 The end result is that
institutions other than the Supreme Court find the relevant facts
underlying the vast majority of constitutional conflicts in the United
States.40 Given the fact sensitivity of most constitutional law
doctrines, this independent constitutional authority to make fact-
findings often amounts to independent authority to resolve constitu-
tional conflicts.41 Jury nullification, sanctioned by Supreme Court
doctrine, prevents the Justices from examining jury decisions ac-
quitting criminal defendants and severely curtails judicial examina-
tion of all other jury verdicts.42 This legally mandated forbearance
35. See, e.g., 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
36. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—
and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53-54 (2006).
37. See generally Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004).
38. See Graber, supra note 19, at 150.
39. Id. at 152.
40. See id. at 154.
41. See id. at 155.
42. See id. at 166.
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has historically enabled juries to act on local constitutional under-
standings in defiance of existing judicial precedent and subvert
judicially mandated constitutional protections for unpopular
minorities, affecting persons of color in particular.43 Supreme Court
doctrine also allocates temporary constitutional authority to elected
officials.44 A system of concrete judicial review vests governing
officials with the power to determine constitutional rights in the
often substantial period of time before the Supreme Court settles a
constitutional question.45 Not infrequently, the Supreme Court
“settles” a constitutional controversy long after that controversy has
lost all, or considerable, political salience.46
This Article examines law deference constitutional doctrines or
practices that empower persons other than Supreme Court Justices
to settle or help settle disputes over the meaning of constitutional
provisions. Part I discusses the political question doctrine, which
vests Congress and the President with the authority to settle some
constitutional disputes. Part I also considers how various “reason-
able doubt” and related rules in constitutional law that give legal
status to mistaken constitutional decisions made in “good faith” vest
some constitutional authority in state and federal legislatures, as
well as in state and federal courts. Part II considers the independ-
ent constitutional authority government officials and ordinary
citizens have to reject on constitutional grounds the exercise of con-
stitutional powers or rights that Supreme Court doctrine maintains
they may constitutionally exercise. Part III notes how long-standing
precedents that the Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdic-
tion only when acting pursuant to a federal statute may vest
ultimate constitutional authority for resolving (almost) all constitu-
tional controversies in Congress. Part IV discusses how Supreme
Court doctrines that facilitate settlements and arbitration, and
exacerbate problems of economic disparities and access to justice,
undermine judicial supremacy. Part V briefly looks at some of the
ideological, legal, political, and pragmatic reasons for judicial
doctrines that cede constitutional authority to persons outside the
Supreme Court. This Article concludes by reconsidering how consti-
43. See id.
44. See id. at 167.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 167-68.
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tutional authority is allocated in the United States and why this
allocation should focus constitutional commentators on pervasive
problems of access to justice.
Constitutional law and practice disperse the power to settle
constitutional conflicts far more widely than most persons who par-
ticipate in the debate over judicial supremacy assume.47 Americans
are not governed by an imperial judiciary that makes or determines
the final decision on every constitutional dispute that arises in the
United States.48 Contemporary constitutional doctrine provides
governing officials, state judges, and ordinary citizens numerous
opportunities to resolve constitutional disputes on the basis of their
interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions.49 Fact defer-
ence provides elected officials and other judicial tribunals with
substantial influence over the resolution of particular constitutional
debates.50 Standing and other jurisdictional rules give these auth-
orities de facto power over most constitutional controversies.51 The
result is that constitutional authority is far messier than the stan-
dard debates between judicial supremacy, departmentalism, and
legislative supremacy might lead unwary readers to suspect.52
This messiness highlights the central role that access to justice
concerns should play in debates over the allocation of constitutional
authority in the United States and other constitutional democracies.
If, as proponents of judicial supremacy believed, Tocqueville was
making a normative as well as an empirical statement when he
asserted, “[s]carcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion,”53 then proactive steps are necessary to ensure that all persons
with plausible constitutional claims have the opportunity to have
those claims adjudicated by courts and, where appropriate, appealed
47. See id. at 178.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 156.
51. See id. at 167.
52. See id. at 167-68.
53. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 280. Tocqueville relied heavily on Joseph Story and
James Kent, who did favor judicial supremacy, when making this assertion. See ANDRÉ
JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 202 (Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway trans., Farrar,
Straus & Giroux 1988) (1984).
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to the Supreme Court of the United States.54 Such opportunities are
sadly lacking in the second decade of the twenty-first century.55
Neither state nor federal judges resolve numerous constitutional
(and legal) disputes because many victims of possible constitutional
wrongs lack the knowledge necessary to recognize that they may
have been victims of a constitutional wrong or lack the means
necessary to file a lawsuit.56 Less fortunate Americans with the
requisite knowledge and the bare means to file a lawsuit often lack
the resources necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and a full
development of the constitutional issues.57 Gideon v. Wainwright,
from this perspective, should be understood as setting out the pre-
conditions for judicial supremacy as well as granting some possible
victims of legal wrongs a right to an attorney.58 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OVER LAW
Contemporary constitutional law and practice divide responsibil-
ity for determining the legal dimensions of constitutional conflicts
between the Supreme Court, other judicial tribunals, elected
officials, and private persons. For example, the Supreme Court
acknowledges a set of “political questions.”59 These are constitu-
tional questions that the Justices think must be resolved by other
governing institutions.60 In addition, the Justices on the Supreme
Court occasionally insist that federal courts should declare unconsti-
tutional only those laws that no reasonable person might think
constitutional.61 The Justices also share constitutional authority in
some Fourth Amendment and habeas corpus cases when they treat
as final police actions and state court decisions based on good faith,
mistaken interpretations of constitutional law.62 The Supreme Court
54. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 11 (2004).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 32-33, 52, 57, 103.
57. See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
869, 873 (2009).
58. See 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
59. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46-47 (1849) (holding that some consti-
tutional questions are nonjusticiable); see also Part I.A.
60. See, e.g., Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 46-47.
61. See infra Part I.B.
62. See infra Part I.B.2.
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almost never interferes when individuals or governing officials give
constitutional reasons for refusing to exercise what judicial ma-
jorities believe are their constitutional rights and powers.63 All
Americans have the power to act on the basis of their independent
understanding of constitutional provisions, as long as they do not
take actions the Supreme Court believes are constitutionally
forbidden.64 The Supreme Court may permit Congress to relocate
constitutional authority in part or entirely by limiting or abolishing
federal judiciary power to adjudicate constitutional cases.65
A. Political Questions
The political question doctrine is the best known legal means by
which contemporary constitutional law allocates constitutional
decision-making to elected officials.66 The Constitution, the Justices
maintain, entrusts the President or Congress with the power to
settle certain controversies over constitutional rights and powers.67
“Underlying the political question doctrine,” Rachel Barkow writes,
“is the recognition that the political branches possess institutional
characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding
certain constitutional questions.”68 These political questions have at
least one of the following six characteristics:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
63. See infra Part II.
64. See infra Part II.
65. See infra Part III.
66. See Barkow, supra note 12, at 239.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 240.
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potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.69
Contemporary constitutional law regards as raising nonjusticiable
political questions constitutional controversies concerning many
issues of foreign policy,70 the war status of the United States,71 the
rules for passing constitutional amendments,72 the constitutional
procedures for impeaching federal officials,73 the federal policy
toward Native Americans,74 and the proper interpretation of the
Guaranty Clause.75 At least four Justices on the Supreme Court also
maintain that partisan gerrymanders raise constitutional questions
that are allocated to other governing officials.76
The political question doctrine cuts a wide swath through the
domains of American constitutionalism, even if the scope of that
doctrine has recently been narrowed.77 Constrained by the political
question doctrine, the Supreme Court has not intervened in the two
centuries old struggle between the President and Congress over
executive power to order troops into foreign combat.78 During a time
when threats of impeachment play an increased role in political
warfare,79 federal courts have steadfastly remained committed to
the proposition that the constitutionality of those procedures is for
elected officials to determine.80 Frederick Schauer’s survey of Ameri-
can constitutional politics at the turn of the twenty-first century
concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States operates on
69. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
70. See Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
71. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29-30 (1827).
72. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939).
73. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993).
74. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865).
75. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-51 (1912).
76. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion).
77. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012). See generally
Barkow, supra note 12, at 267-68.
78. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 302 (3d ed. 2013); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN,
LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-12 (2013).
79. See BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: POLITICIANS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO WHITEWATER 38 (3d ed. 2002); DAVID E.
KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE SINCE 1960, at 2-3
(2008).
80. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993).
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the political margins81 in large part because many issues that excite
Americans, most notably presidential policy on terrorism, either do
not raise constitutional questions or raise constitutional questions
that contemporary constitutional law allocates to elected officials.82
The Supreme Court’s decisions on justiciability have practical
impact on the allocation of constitutional authority in the United
States. For example, recent Supreme Court decisions refusing to
rule on the constitutional standards for partisan gerrymandering
are enabling some state legislatures to nullify the Seventeenth
Amendment in part.83 The Seventeenth Amendment abolished state
legislative elections of senators in favor of popular elections.84 In the
absence of judicially mandated standards, state legislatures deter-
mine the partisan composition of the state delegation to the House
of Representatives and, through threats of redistricting, exercise
some pressure over state members of that legislative chamber.85
“[P]olitical party gerrymandering,” Max Stearns details, “‘restores’
state legislative control over congressional delegations, but switches
control relative to the original Constitution from the Senate to the
House.”86
The political question doctrine of Baker v. Carr is not the political
question doctrine of Marbury v. Madison.87 Both limit judicial power
in the United States, but in different ways. Baker speaks to the
allocation of constitutional authority.88 Justice William Brennan’s
majority opinion divided the constitutional universe into constitu-
tional questions fit for judicial resolution and constitutional ques-
tions allocated to other branches of the national government.89 In
81. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 11 (“[T]he Court ... operates overwhelmingly in areas
of low public salience.”).
82. Id. at 31-32 (“[T]he public is concerned about Iraq more than anything else, but
neither the wisdom nor the legality nor the conduct of that conflict constituted any part of the
Court’s work.”).
83. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Economics of Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 991, 1002 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Compare Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), with Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66
(1803). The Supreme Court in Baker may have confused the two. See Tara Leigh Grove, The
Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1937-38, 1968 (2015).
88. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
89. See id. at 210-11.
2017] JUDICIAL SUPREMACY REVISITED 1565
contrast to Baker, Marbury speaks to the allocation of authority
more generally. Chief Justice John Marshall drew a line between
constitutional and political questions when asserting: “[b]y the
constitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to
use his own discretion” and that, therefore, “there exists ... no
[judicial] power to control that discretion” because “[t]he subjects
are political.”90 This passage divides the universe of official decisions
into legal questions about the meaning of the Constitution, which
courts could resolve, and policy choices between constitutionally
permitted alternatives, which courts may not resolve. The latter cat-
egory presently encompasses almost all tax, spending, and foreign
policy problems that do not raise separation of powers issues.91 The
Baker political question doctrine demonstrates that the Supreme
Court does not have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation.92
The Marbury political question doctrine demonstrates the Supreme
Court is a far less salient participant in American politics than the
literature on judicial supremacy suggests.93
B. Reasonable Doubt and Good Faith Rules
Powerful traditions in American constitutionalism insist that
Supreme Court Justices should share constitutional authority with
elected officials on all constitutional controversies. Supreme Court
opinions dating from the late eighteenth century and influential
commentaries on the judicial function maintain that the Justices
should permit elected officials to make close constitutional judg-
ments, only declaring unconstitutional legislation that is a plain
abuse of constitutional power. Although this practice is largely
honored only in the breach, related sub-traditions exist in contempo-
rary constitutional law. The Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts
apply reasonableness or good faith standards when determining
when government officials may be sued for committing certain con-
stitutional wrongs, when federal courts in habeas corpus cases may
correct certain constitutional wrongs, and when unconstitutionally
90. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165-66.
91. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 32.
92. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11.
93. See Graber, supra note 37, at 493-95; Schauer, supra note 36, at 11-12.
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obtained evidence may be excluded at trial. Each good faith or
reasonableness rule in practice allocates constitutional authority to
settle certain questions to governing officials outside the Supreme
Court. 
1. The Rule of Reasonable Doubt
James Bradley Thayer developed a particularly influential
conception of shared constitutional authority when he insisted that
Justices are not authorized to strike down legislation after “con-
clud[ing] that upon a just and true construction the law is unconsti-
tutional.”94 Judicial review was legitimate, he believed, only “when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not
open to rational question.”95 Elected officials and federal judges had
different obligations when determining when a proposal is constitu-
tional.96 Elected officials made contested constitutional choices.97
Justices provided a check only on abuses of constitutional author-
ity.98 “[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a
measure as being, in his judgment, unconstitutional,” Thayer
stated, “and, being subsequently placed on the bench, when this
measure, having been passed by the legislature in spite of his
opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty,
although he has in no degree changed his opinion, to declare it con-
stitutional.”99 Justices who sustain a congressional ban on home-
grown wheat that a reasonable person might think is a legitimate
exercise of the federal commerce power leave for the national
legislature the authority to determine whether the Commerce
Clause is best interpreted as permitting Congress to ban home-
grown wheat.
Many Supreme Court Justices insist that they are guided by this
rule of reasonable doubt when considering the allocation of constitu-
94. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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tional authority in the United States.100 Justices before the Civil
War often asserted that they would declare laws unconstitutional
only in a clear case.101 “[T]o authorise this Court to pronounce any
law void,” Justice William Paterson stated, “it must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumen-
tative implication.”102 Thayer’s conception of the judicial function in
constitutional cases influenced many proponents of judicial restraint
during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.103 “I think that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted,”
Justice Holmes wrote when dissenting in Lochner v. New York,
“unless ... a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”104
Some contemporary judicial opinions suggest that elected officials
are empowered to make borderline constitutional judgments. “Re-
spect for a coordinate branch of Government forbids striking down
an Act of Congress except upon a clear showing of unconstitutional-
ity,” Justice Anthony Kennedy asserted in Salazar v. Buono.105
Sincere, across-the-board application of the rule of no reasonable
doubt licenses substantial independent constitutional authority. On
the perhaps generous assumption that the vast majority of federal
and state justices, elected officials, and persons who teach constitu-
tional law meet minimal qualifications for rationality, Thayer’s
principle would require the Supreme Court to defer to elected of-
ficials on almost every major constitutional controversy that has
arisen or is likely to arise in the United States. Very few Supreme
Court decisions declaring unconstitutional politically salient state
and federal laws are unanimous. Such decisions as Roe v. Wade
survive Thayerite scrutiny only on the assumption that Justices
Rehnquist and White, majorities in forty-six state legislatures, and
prominent commentators on both the right and left had taken leave
of their senses when disputing the judicial majority’s conclusion
100. See Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 (1978).
101. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Paterson, J.).
102. Id.
103. See Mendelson, supra note 100, at 71.
104. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect abortion rights.106 Unanimous Supreme Court opin-
ions are not immune to the rule of no reasonable doubt. That an
exceptionally respected scholar and an exceptionally respected
judge, both of whom opposed segregation as a matter of policy,
concluded that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly decided,107
provides powerful grounds for concluding that Supreme Court
Justices committed to the rule of no reasonable doubt should have
deferred to state legislative judgments on the best way to educate
children of different races. Congressional and state legislative
majorities could nullify Roe v. Wade by pointing to the numerous
reasonable experts in constitutional law who think the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments do not protect abortion rights.108
The rule of no reasonable doubt allocates independent constitu-
tional authority only to the elected branches of the national
government. Thayer endorsed law deference only when courts were
determining whether a coordinate branch of government had made
a constitutional mistake. He thought the rule of reasonable doubt
should not be applied when federal courts were reviewing state
legislation.109 Although early Supreme Court opinions invoked the
rule of the clear case when adjudicating states cases,110 contempo-
rary Supreme Court Justices follow Thayer by restricting invoca-
tions of the no reasonable doubt rule to congressional legislation.
“When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that
has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by
the President,” several opinions assert, “it should only do so for the
most compelling constitutional reasons.”111 No similar language ap-
pears in any contemporary Supreme Court opinion considering the
constitutionality of state laws.
106. See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
107. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (Atheneum 1972) (1958); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1959).
108. See Ely, supra note 106, at 935-37.
109. Thayer, supra note 94, at 154-55.
110. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); Thayer, supra
note 94, at 140-42.
111. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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Whether Supreme Court majorities ever actually deferred to
congressional interpretations of constitutional provisions is contro-
versial. Professor Sylvia Snowiss insists that antebellum Justices
took seriously the obligation to declare laws unconstitutional only
in a clear case.112 And Professor Robert Clinton claims that early
Supreme Court Justices believed they were authorized to declare
unconstitutional only laws that touched on the Article III powers of
federal courts.113 These understandings of the judicial function
allocate substantial independent constitutional authority to
Congress. Other commentators maintain that Justices before the
Civil War rarely did more than pay lip service to the Thayerite
conception that constitutional authority rested in Congress, unless
the national legislature clearly abused its powers.114 The Marshall
Court does not appear to have applied the rule of reasonable doubt
in Marbury v. Madison when declaring unconstitutional Section 13
of the Judiciary Act, given the strong argument that the provision
was constitutional.115 Evidence that the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional far more laws restricting property and other rights
before the Civil War than previously thought also casts considerable
doubt on claims that antebellum Justices believed the judicial power
was limited to laws of a judiciary nature.116
Few commentators think contemporary judicial practice is at all
deferential to Congress on matters of constitutional law. No Justice
on the Burger, Rehnquist, or Roberts Courts has demonstrated
much restraint when declaring federal laws unconstitutional.117
Professor Michael Klarman observed that “we have a Supreme
Court that engages in unparalleled activism—from the left and the
112. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 59-63 (1990).
113. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 76, 256 n.88
(1989).
114. For a particularly sharp criticism of Snowiss and Clinton, see Dean Alfange, Jr., Mar-
bury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional
Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 329-30, 335-49, 385-413.
115. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1, 16-33.
116. See Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Auth-
ority, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 177, 180-81 (2007); Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of
Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1257-59 (2009).
117. See generally THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 107-253 (2004).
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right simultaneously!”118 The last week of the 2013 term was typical.
On June 25, Justice Kennedy and the four more conservative
Justices declared unconstitutional a crucial provision of the Voting
Rights Act.119 The next day, Justice Kennedy and the four more
liberal Justices declared unconstitutional a crucial provision of the
Defense of Marriage Act.120 No member of the Roberts Court was
willing to accede any constitutional authority to Congress when
considering federal legislation inconsistent with their cherished
constitutional values.
City of Boerne v. Flores provides a particularly vivid example of
the present judicial abandonment of law deference.121 That case
concerned the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA) of 1993,122 bipartisan legislation that sought to
restore the compelling interest test in free exercise cases that the
Supreme Court rejected in Employment Division v. Smith.123 The
Justices in City of Boerne disputed whether RFRA correctly in-
terpreted constitutional free exercise rights. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
forbade only state laws that discriminated against religious believ-
ers.124 Justice O’Connor’s dissent maintained that the congressional
test was constitutionally correct and that the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits state laws that burden religious practice as well as state
discriminations against religious believers.125 Justice O’Connor
nevertheless agreed with the majority’s view that Congress lacked
authority to interpret independently the meaning of any constitu-
tional provision.126 Constitutional interpretation was strictly the
province of federal courts. In sharp contrast to his rhetoric in Sala-
zar v. Buono, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Boerne
asserted, “If Congress could define its own powers by altering the
118. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 548 (1997).
119. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
120. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
121. See generally 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
122. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-
4).
123. 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990).
124. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35.
125. See id. at 546-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 519 (majority opinion); id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitu-
tion be ‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’
It would be ‘on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, ... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.’”127
Justice O’Connor disputed Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of
religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but
she wholeheartedly endorsed Kennedy’s assertion that Congress
had no independent authority to determine the meaning of those or
any other constitutional provisions: “[W]hen it enacts legislation in
furtherance of its delegated powers,” her dissent asserted, “Congress
must make its judgments consistent with this Court’s exposition of
the Constitution and with the limits placed on its legislative
authority by provisions such as the Fourteenth Amendment.”128
2. Good Faith Mistakes
Variations on the rule of reasonable doubt have a limited oper-
ation in discrete areas of contemporary constitutional law. The
Supreme Court presently treats as legally significant certain consti-
tutional decisions made by police officers, state judges, and other
governing officials that are based on what the Justices believe are
mistaken interpretations of Supreme Court precedents. Trial courts
127. Id. at 529 (majority opinion) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (alteration in original)).
128. Id. at 545-46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Other constitutional commentators have
proposed other means by which the Supreme Court may share constitutional authority. Some
maintain that Supreme Court Justices may employ only some forms of constitutional logic
when determining the meaning of constitutional provisions. Keith Whittington insists that
aspirational arguments are legitimate means for legislative efforts to construct the Constitu-
tion, but not for Justices engaged in constitutional interpretation. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW 108-09 (1999). In his view, a judicial decision sustaining capital punishment as consis-
tent with the original meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” leaves for elected officials
to decide whether capital punishment is consistent with the best constitutional understanding
of justice. See id. at 182-87. Possible distinctions between the judicially enforceable Consti-
tution and the legal Constitution provide related limitations on Supreme Court decision-mak-
ing. Lawrence Sager contends, Justices must “underenforce” such constitutional norms as
equal protection because they lack the capacity to determine and enforce all the policies neces-
sary for Americans to become fully equal citizens. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221, 1226-
27 (1978). Little evidence exists, however, that contemporary constitutional law relies on
either of these two means for sharing constitutional authority.
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may admit unconstitutionally seized evidence as long as police
officers believed in good faith that the search met constitutional
standards. “[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on
a subsequently invalidated search warrant,” Justice White’s
majority opinion in United States v. Leon asserted, “cannot justify
the substantial costs of exclusion.”129 The Supreme Court gives legal
status to state court rulings in some habeas corpus proceedings that
the Justices believe are mistaken on points of federal constitutional
law.130 Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Stone v. Powell con-
cluded, “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial.”131 Litigation may be “full and fair,” Powell
stated, even when the state court failed to apply the correct
constitutional rules as articulated by the Supreme Court.132 State
court judges in habeas corpus cases may interpret ambiguous
federal precedents as they think best. The Supreme Court will not
reverse a mistaken interpretation of a constitutional provision “on
collateral review unless the decision was dictated by precedent
existing at the time the petitioner’s conviction became final.”133 Good
faith rules also affect remedies for constitutional wrongs. Governing
officials who violate constitutional rights cannot be constitutionally
sued when their behavior was based on a reasonable interpretation
of the relevant constitutional decisions. In Safford Unified School
District No. 1 v. Redding, the Supreme Court ruled, “A school official
searching a student is ‘entitled to qualified immunity where clearly
established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.’”134
Little if any difference exists between most good faith rules and
Thayer’s rule of reasonable doubt. The good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule relies on “objectively reasonable reliance” rather
129. 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
130. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
131. Id. (footnote omitted).
132. Id.
133. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990).
134. 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44 (2009)).
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than subjective mental states.135 The Supreme Court, when deter-
mining what constitutes “clearly established law”136 or decisions
“dictated by precedent,”137 gives legal standing to any reasonable
interpretation of constitutional law. “The relevant, dispositive in-
quiry in determining whether a right is clearly established,” Justice
Kennedy maintained in Saucier v. Katz, “is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.”138 Justices White and Souter asserted,
“The result in a given case is not dictated by precedent if it is ‘sus-
ceptible to debate among reasonable minds,’ or, put differently, ‘if
reasonable jurists may disagree.’”139 This statement is Thayer’s rule
of no reasonable doubt, minus any citation to Thayer.
These variations on the rule of no reasonable doubt highlight an
unappreciated distinction between the authority to decide a partic-
ular constitutional dispute and the authority to have the final say
on what constitutional provisions mean. Good faith and reasonable-
ness rules are consistent with the Supreme Court being the ultimate
constitutional interpreter. Judicial decisions on the exclusionary
rule, habeas corpus appeals, and qualified immunity do not permit
police officers, state judges, and other governing officials to know-
ingly challenge judicial authority. These governing officials
nevertheless retain the power to have the final say on particular
constitutional controversies that arise before the Supreme Court
clarifies the relevant constitutional law. Under United States v.
Leon, a police officer’s good faith judgment that a search warrant
meets the probable cause standard settles all constitutional
questions about the admissibility of evidence obtained during the
subsequent search, even if the Supreme Court later clarifies that a
search based on an identical warrant is subject to the exclusionary
rule.140 Similarly, the fact that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
in Graham v. Collins thought that state law provided constitution-
ally adequate procedures for presenting mitigating evidence in
135. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
136. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 243.
137. Butler, 494 at 409.
138. 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
139. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476 (1993) (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,
238 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
140. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
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capital cases settled the dispute between Gary Graham and Texas
officials over the constitutionality of Graham’s death sentence even
though, after Graham’s conviction became final, the Supreme Court
required Texas officials to adopt different procedures in future
capital cases.141
The constitutional authority vested by good faith rules is limited
in substance and scope. State officials must offer reasonable inter-
pretations of existing federal precedent. A state court that found a
search to be constitutional on the ground that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment would not satisfy the “full and fair” requirement
of Stone v. Powell.142 Many good faith and reasonableness rules
affect constitutional remedies rather than substance of the right.
Savana Redding could not sue the school officials who subjected her
to an unconstitutional search because those officials made an honest
error of constitutional law.143 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that those school officials could not suspend Redding on the basis of
the contraband they found during their unconstitutional search. A
state court ruling that unconstitutionally obtained evidence is
admissible at trial does not preclude a civil lawsuit for damages.144
The effectiveness of such alternative remedies varies. Police officers,
magistrates, and state judges who mistakenly decide a search was
constitutional have the final say for all practical purposes on the
constitutional disputes over the admissibility of the evidence
obtained, given the impracticality of the alternative remedy: the
civil lawsuit.145
Good faith rules enable state actors to exercise independent
constitutional authority with the legal permission of the Supreme
Court. Police officers, state judges, and other governing officials
cannot directly defy federal mandates, but they can give them the
most favorable interpretation possible confident that their judgment
will be the final word on a particular constitutional incident or, at
141. See Graham, 506 U.S. at 467-77.
142. See 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
143. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377-79 (2009).
144. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRIN-
CIPLES 35-36 (1997).
145. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
848-49 (1994).
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the very least, that they will not be personally held responsible for
making a constitutional mistake. State judges hostile to what they
perceive as more liberal trends in constitutional criminal procedure
are constitutionally authorized by the Supreme Court to deny any
rights claim in habeas corpus proceedings, unless such a ruling is a
flagrant violation of existing law.146 Given the importance of habeas
corpus for vindicating constitutional rights, particularly for less
fortunate persons who cannot afford trial counsel that devote full
attention to their defense, this empowerment provides state judges
substantial opportunities to frustrate the implementation of federal
rules protecting persons suspected of criminal offenses. Police
officers need not worry whether the evidence they present to a judge
or a magistrate actually meets the constitutional standards for a
search warrant because a favorable decision issuing such a warrant
automatically immunizes whatever evidence they subsequently
obtain from suppression.147 Justice Brennan noted in his Leon
dissent,
[T]he Court’s “reasonable mistake” exception to the exclusionary
rule will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the law.
Armed with the assurance provided by today’s decisions that
evidence will always be admissible whenever an officer has
“reasonably” relied upon a warrant, police departments will be
encouraged to train officers that if a warrant has simply been
signed, it is reasonable, without more, to rely on it. Since in close
cases there will no longer be any incentive to err on the side of
constitutional behavior, police would have every reason to adopt
a “let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided” approach in situations in which
there is a question about a warrant’s validity or the basis for its
issuance.148
On this premise, magistrates and judges who believe that fighting
crime is more important than protecting rights are constitutionally
authorized by the Supreme Court to grant any constitutionally
plausible police request for a search warrant.
146. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
147. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
148. Id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1576 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1549
3. Unreasonable Mistakes?
The Supreme Court in Utah v. Strieff ceded constitutional author-
ity to police officers who had engaged in conceded unconstitutional
behavior under any interpretation of the relevant precedents.149
Strieff explores when courts may constitutionally admit evidence
obtained as the result of an unconstitutional stop because “the link
between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the
evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression.”150 In this case, the
officer made an unconstitutional stop, learned that the defendant
had an outstanding traffic warrant, and then discovered illegal
drugs after arresting the defendant pursuant to that warrant.151
When considering the relationship between the unconstitutional
stop and the discovery of the incriminating evidence, Justice Clar-
ence Thomas’s majority opinion declared “‘particularly’ significant
... ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’”152 Neither
the state nor any Justice in the majority claimed that the stop was
based on a reasonable, if mistaken, interpretation of existing consti-
tutional law. Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent bluntly observed that
the stop “was a calculated decision, taken with so little justification
that the State has never tried to defend its legality.”153 The only
“good-faith” mistakes the majority identified was the officer’s failure
to obtain the evidence for a stop required by clear, established
constitutional law.154 Nevertheless, although the stop had no
reasonable constitutional foundation, Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion insisted that the resulting evidence could be admitted
because the police did not self-consciously violate constitutional
rights.155 He wrote, there was “no indication that this unlawful stop
was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct,” but was,
instead, “an isolated instance of negligence.”156 Justice Thomas’s log-
ic suggests that evidence discovered by a police officer acting on that
149. See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
150. Id. at 2059.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2062 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975)).
153. Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see id. at 2062 (majority opinion) (noting the state’s
concession that the stop had no constitutional basis).
154. See id. at 2063.
155. See id.
156. Id.
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police officer’s interpretation of the rules for constitutional searches,
no matter how divorced those rules are from the official constitu-
tional rules established by the Court, is admissible as long as the
police do not know the actual constitutional rules.157
The constitutional authority vested in police officers conducting
searches by virtue of the good faith and attenuation exceptions to
the exclusionary rule is now broader than the constitutional
authority vested in state judges conducting habeas corpus hearings
by virtue of the clear precedent rule. The Supreme Court gives legal
status to the constitutionally mistaken judgments state judges
make only when those judgments are reasonable interpretations of
existing precedent.158 Strieff gives legal status to the constitutionally
mistaken judgments police officers make as long as the officers do
not self-consciously or, perhaps, recklessly violate existing constitu-
tional law.159 That the police behavior was inconsistent with a line
of clear judicial precedents does not require suppressing evidence
that was later discovered as a result of that misbehavior. Police
officers, unlike state judges (and those they arrest), may plead
ignorance of the law. Contrary to Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent,
the contemporary “Fourth Amendment does ... tolerate an officer’s
unreasonable searches and seizures just because he did not know
any better.”160
II. INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY TO REJECT SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Persons other than Supreme Court Justices exercise independent
constitutional authority when they reject Supreme Court decisions
on the meaning of constitutional provisions as a guide to their
behavior and then act in ways forbidden by those precedents.
Supreme Court decisions holding that states are constitutionally
permitted to exercise certain powers and individuals are constitu-
tionally permitted to exercise certain rights cede to the relevant
state officials and individuals the ultimate constitutional authority
to decide whether they may constitutionally exercise those powers
157. See id.
158. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
159. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
160. But see id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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and rights. If the Supreme Court rules that the Constitution
sanctions capital punishment,161 state officials who conclude that
the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
may refrain from executing murderers. If the Supreme Court rules
that persons have a constitutional right to compensation when
government regulations destroy the economic value of their
property,162 persons who believe the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment forbids only physical takings may refrain from seeking
compensation when they are victims of regulatory takings.
Federal and state officials, state judges, and private persons on
the basis of their independent constitutional judgment often refrain
from exercising a constitutional power or right vested in them by
the relevant federal judicial precedents. The Supreme Court in
McCulloch v. Maryland held that the federal government had the
power to incorporate a national bank.163 Andrew Jackson subse-
quently vetoed a bill rechartering the national bank on the ground
that he believed the federal government was not authorized to
establish such an institution.164 The Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia and McCleskey v. Kemp held that state procedures for
imposing death sentences met constitutional standards for funda-
mental fairness.165 Governor George Ryan of Illinois subsequently
commuted the death sentences of all persons on death row in
Illinois, because he concluded that the procedures for imposing
death sentences did not meet constitutional standards for funda-
mental fairness.166 The Supreme Court has held in a series of cases
that universities may not consider race in the admissions process
when there are race-neutral alternatives that adequately serve the
compelling interest of a diverse student body.167 Rejected college
applicants who believe the Constitution permits admissions officers
to use race to compensate for historical disadvantages may never-
161. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-76 (1976) (plurality opinion).
162. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
163. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 370 (1819).
164. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 23, at 576.
165. See generally McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
166. See Wilgoren, supra note 22.
167. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 270, 275 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-25, 339-40 (2003);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-20 (1978).
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theless refrain from suing a university whose admissions policies do
not meet Supreme Court standards.
Supreme Court rulings vesting government officials and individu-
als with certain powers and rights cede to those officials and indi-
viduals the independent constitutional authority to settle particular
constitutional controversies. Chief Justice Marshall was mistaken
in McCulloch when he asserted, “[o]n the Supreme Court of the
United States has the constitution of our country devolved th[e]
important duty” of settling whether the federal government may
incorporate a national bank.168 President Jackson’s decision to veto
the bill rechartering the Second Bank of the United States ended
the constitutional controversy over that measure.169 Supreme Court
Justices who disagreed with Jackson’s constitutional analysis could
neither force Jackson to sign the bank bill nor compel him to confine
his objections to matters of public policy. Governor Ryan’s decision
to commute the sentences of all persons on death row in Illinois
settled whether their individual death sentences met constitutional
standards for fundamental fairness.170 Similarly, Supreme Court
Justices who disagreed with Ryan’s decision could neither force
Ryan to sign execution warrants nor compel him to confine his
objections to state constitutional concerns. State prosecutorial
decisions not to pursue the death penalty in a particular case that
are based on convictions that capital punishment in that instance
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similarly settle
any constitutional controversy over whether that defendant ought
to be executed. Private citizens exercise this independent constitu-
tional authority to settle constitutional controversies when they
refrain for constitutional reasons from behaviors permitted by
existing constitutional law. Courts have no power to interfere when
persons refuse to burn a flag or terminate a pregnancy on the
ground they believe the Supreme Court decisions striking down
laws forbidding these actions are null and void. Persons who refuse
to sue after being rejected from law school end any controversy over
whether they had a constitutional right to be accepted or at least
experience a different admissions process. Supreme Court Justices
168. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
169. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 23, at 576.
170. See Wilgoren, supra note 22.
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who disagree with these private constitutional choices may neither
force persons to exercise their judicially announced constitutional
rights nor successfully sue institutions that have denied those
rights.
Persons who reject Supreme Court decisions holding that they
have certain constitutional powers or rights are exercising inde-
pendent constitutional authority and not simply making policy
decisions the Justices permit them to make. President Jackson and
Governor Ryan gave constitutional reasons for their decisions not to
take actions permitted by existing precedent.171 These and related
exercises of independent constitutional authority settle constitu-
tional controversies, large and small. Existing constitutional law
regards as final state gubernatorial decisions to refuse conditional
federal health care funds that the governor believes, contrary to
Supreme Court precedent,172 the federal government is not constitu-
tionally empowered to allocate.173 Existing standing law regards as
final decisions by rejected law school applicants not to sue a law
school that uses racial quotas in the admissions process that the
rejected applicants believe, contrary to Supreme Court precedent,174
do not violate the constitutional right to a race-neutral admissions
process.175 
Governing officials and individual citizens are exercising indepen-
dent constitutional authority, even when their decisions are local
and possibly temporary. As noted above, governing officials and
individual citizens are often constitutionally authorized to resolve
specific constitutional disputes, even when they are not authorized
to settle the meaning of constitutional provisions outside their juris-
diction.176 The Mississippi legislature may decide on constitutional
grounds whether that state will accept federal healthcare funds, but
Mississippi officials may not compel the Governor of Alabama to
abide by their constitutional verdict. Decisions by persons on death
row not to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences settle
171. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 23, at 582-88; Wilgoren, supra note
22.
172. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
173. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997).
174. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
175. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (holding that litigants must
demonstrate concrete and particularlized injuries).
176. See, e.g., supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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controversies over whether they may be constitutionally executed
but not controversies over whether other persons on death row may
constitutionally suffer the same fate. State governors exercise inde-
pendent constitutional authority when determining that the capital
sentencing process in their state is unconstitutional, even though
they may change their minds or be replaced by governors with a
different view on the constitutionally acceptable procedures for
imposing the death penalty. Supreme Court decisions are no more
etched in stone than constitutional decisions made by other of-
ficials.177 Nevertheless, no one thinks that a Supreme Court decision
sustaining a particular federal funding program is not a consti-
tutional decision just because the Justices might change their mind,
or new Justices in the future might make a different decision.178
Whether these exercises of independent constitutional authority
nullify Supreme Court decisions depends on the meaning of nullif-
ication.179 If nullification requires governing officials to challenge
the Supreme Court’s authority to have the final say over the
meaning of constitutional provisions and take actions forbidden by
federal constitutional law,180 then neither President Jackson nor
Governor Ryan nullified a Supreme Court decision. Neither took
actions forbidden by federal constitutional law. McCulloch did not
compel the federal government to incorporate a national bank. The
Supreme Court has never insisted that states must punish murder
by death. If, however, nullification consists only of challenging the
Supreme Court’s authority to have the final say over the meaning
of constitutional provisions, then Jackson and Ryan were nullifiers.
Both maintained that they had a right to make an independent
constitutional judgment when determining, respectively, whether
the national bank was constitutional and whether existing proce-
dures for imposing the death penalty met Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment standards. McCulloch was not the law of the land while
Jacksonian presidents were in office.181 Gregg and McCleskey had no
177. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002).
178. Or, for that matter, because that decision might have been made on nonconstitutional
grounds.
179. See Read & Allen, supra note 33, at 268.
180. See Graber, supra note 19, at 168.
181. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND
FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 85-86 (2007).
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legal status in Illinois while Governor Ryan reigned. Some contem-
porary practice is rooted in this more lenient standard for nullifica-
tion. Several states during the twenty-first century declared federal
laws null and void, even when state authorities are merely exercis-
ing their constitutional power to refuse conditional federal funds or
refraining from having state officials implement federal law.182
Michigan v. Long challenged state judicial power to engage in
independent constitutional interpretation.183 That case reversed a
state court decision holding that police officers had unconstitution-
ally engaged in a warrantless search of an automobile.184 The Su-
preme Court of Michigan erred, a Burger Court majority ruled, by
interpreting Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights more broad-
ly than did the Supreme Court of the United States.185 Overturning
such state rulings was necessary, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
majority opinion declared, to “preserve the integrity of federal
law”186 given the “important need for uniformity.”187 Justice
O’Connor left state courts free to interpret individual rights provi-
sions in the state constitution more broadly than identical provi-
sions in the Federal Constitution. Her opinion acknowledged that
state judges are constitutionally authorized to give state constitu-
tional justifications for decisions forbidding state officials to behave
in ways the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled are
permitted by the Federal Constitution.188 Nevertheless, Justice
O’Connor insisted that state court constitutional judgments be
limited to interpretations of the state constitution.189 “It is funda-
mental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in
interpreting their state constitutions,” she wrote, “[b]ut it is equally
important that ... state courts do not stand as barriers to a determi-
nation by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of
state action.”190
182. See John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of
American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1643-46 (2011).
183. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42, 1044 (1983).
184. See People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869-70 (Mich. 1982).
185. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-52.
186. Id. at 1041.
187. Id. at 1040.
188. See id. at 1040-42.
189. See id. at 1043-44.
190. Id. at 1041 (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940)).
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Long is anomalous. The Supreme Court does not correct state
governors, prosecutors, and police officers who interpret their
powers more narrowly or individual rights more broadly than
warranted by existing precedent. Had the Attorney General of
Michigan refused to appeal the state court decision in Long on the
ground that the Supreme Court of Michigan correctly interpreted
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court of
Michigan’s decision in Long would have settled all disputes in
Michigan over whether the Constitution of the United States
sanctioned certain warrantless searches. The Supreme Court of the
United States would not have intervened had the Chief of Police in
Detroit banned all warrantless searches of automobiles and the
State District Attorney forbade state prosecutors from introducing
at criminal trials the fruits of any warrantless search of an automo-
bile the day after Long was decided. The federal judiciary would
have remained on the sidelines even if Michigan officials stated that
their only reason for banning the fruits of warrantless searches of
automobiles was that the Supreme Court of the United States in
Long erroneously interpreted the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Although Justice O’Connor spoke of the need to ensure that
federal constitutional law be the same in all states,191 these ex-
amples highlight that state courts after Long are the only state
governing institutions that may not independently interpret the
Constitution of the United States as protecting more rights than the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Long fits existing constitutional practice only as a prophylactic
means for ensuring that state judicial attempts to exercise inde-
pendent constitutional authority are actually independent. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion worried that state judges might be handing
down overly broad interpretations of federal constitutional rights
only because the judges “believed that federal law required [them]
to do so” rather than because they had independently reached the
conclusion that the Supreme Court was too narrowly interpreting
the constitutional right in question.192 So understood, the logic of
Long is consistent with the general principle that governing officials
may exercise independent constitutional authority as long as they
191. See id.
192. Id. at 1041.
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are not attempting to justify what the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled are constitutionally forbidden actions. Michigan v.
Long merely enables the Supreme Court to distinguish state judicial
attempts to exercise independent constitutional authority from
mistaken state judicial interpretations of Supreme Court prece-
dents.193 
Still, Long so understood does little more than mask state court
exercises of independent constitutional authority. State judges, who
fear that the United States Supreme Court will reverse their
decisions broadly interpreting federal constitutional rights, have the
option of “interpreting” their state constitution consistently with
what they regard as the correct interpretation of the United States
Constitution.194 State judicial opinions striking down state proce-
dures for imposing capital punishment may repeat verbatim Justice
William Brennan’s constitutional arguments against the death
penalty,195 editing only the constitution that the death penalty is
said to violate. Justice Thomas Kavanagh, of the Michigan Supreme
Court, applied this logic when he switched from federal to state
constitutional grounds after the Supreme Court of the United States
remanded Long to his bench.196 Kavanagh’s opinion, declaring
unconstitutional the police action in controversy, stated:
When in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11 the citizens of Michigan
eschewed warrantless searches, they might have been confident
that the United States Constitution forbade them. Our first
opinion in this case no doubt should have made it clearer that
whether or not the United States Constitution be later read to
allow them, the Michigan Constitution does not.197
193. Contemporary constitutional law does not clearly indicate what the Supreme Court
would do when confronted with an obstinate state court whose members insisted that they
were correcting the Supreme Court’s mistakenly narrow interpretation of federal constitu-
tional rights rather than basing their decision on broader state constitutional rights. For
reasons noted in the next paragraph, state courts are unlikely to take that route, given that
they can easily immunize any such decision from judicial review by claiming to rely exclu-
sively on the state constitution. 
194. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
195. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. See People v. Long, 359 N.W.2d 194, 201 (Mich. 1984) (Kavanagh, J., concurring).
197. Id.
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Kavanagh made no effort to explain why provisions in the Michigan
Constitution should be interpreted differently than similar provi-
sions in the United States Constitution.198 Long did not compel him
to take that step.199 All that precedent demanded was that
Kavanagh instruct his word processing program to replace the
relevant references to “the Constitution of the United States” with
“the Michigan Constitution.”200 These verbal gymnastics suggest
that the rule more consistent with constitutional practice in the
United States is that state judges may interpret constitutional
powers more narrowly and constitutional rights more broadly than
does the Supreme Court of the United States, as long as the state
judges make clear that they are exercising independent constitu-
tional authority rather than anticipating how Federal Justices are
likely to rule on the constitutional issue in question.201
The aftermath of Michigan v. Long suggests that Federal Justices
and other proponents of judicial supremacy should acknowledge
that the Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate consti-
tutional authority only when the Justices declare that particular ac-
tions are forbidden by the Constitution.202 Long aside, the Supreme
Court makes no effort to correct what the Justices believe are
mistaken interpretations of constitutional provisions when those
interpretations are not made for the purpose of attempting to justify
what the Justices have ruled are constitutionally forbidden actions.
The Michigan Supreme Court’s response to Long demonstrates that
all the Justices can do in these circumstances is change the verbal
formulas that other governing officials use when publicly justifying
decisions reached on the basis of those officials’ independent inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States. Americans from
Thomas Jefferson to Governor George Ryan have had the final say
on constitutional controversies, ranging from the constitutionality
of convictions obtained under the Alien and Sedition Acts203 to the
198. See id.
199. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041-42.
200. See id.
201. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a
State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1635-36
(2010).
202. See id. at 1637.
203. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1801-1806, at 310, 310-11 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897).
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constitutionality of the death penalty in Illinois,204 when they
asserted that their independent interpretations of the Constitution
compelled them to refrain from exercising powers that earlier Su-
preme Court decisions constitutionally empowered them to take.205
Theories of constitutional authority should not pretend otherwise by
labeling as mere policy choices the decisions of elected officials and
others that settled constitutional disputes are publicly justified by
claims that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the relevant
constitutional provisions.
Constitutions empower and limit.206 Courts, subject to numerous
qualifications,207 may have the final say when the Justices attempt
to limit government. Other governing officials and ordinary citizens,
however, have the final say after Supreme Court decisions empower
government or protect individual rights. Judicial decisions that
permit Congress to adopt a particular spending program, state
judges to admit certain evidence, and citizens to make certain
criticisms of government officials allocate the ultimate constitu-
tional authority to Congress, state judges, and citizens, respectively,
to settle the constitutional status of these matters. Supreme Court
Justices are powerless to force states to exercise powers that state
officials believe forbidden by the Constitution, contrary to Supreme
Court precedent, or to compel individuals to exercise rights that the
individual believes are not protected by the Constitution, contrary
to Supreme Court precedent.
III. JURISDICTION
Long-standing judicial precedent holds that the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court exists by legislative grace. Within a
decade after the Constitution was ratified, the Justices on the Su-
preme Court agreed, “[i]f Congress has provided no rule to regulate
204. See Wilgoren, supra note 22.
205. Or in Jefferson’s case, pardoning on constitutional grounds persons the federal
judiciary had ruled were constitutionally convicted. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail
Adams, supra note 203, at 310-11.
206. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 161-64 (1995).
207. In addition to the qualifications noted in this Article, see generally Graber, supra note
19.
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our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction.”208
Chief Justice John Marshall in 1810 maintained that the “affirma-
tive description” of jurisdiction laid out in the Judiciary Act of 1789
“has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such
appellate power as is not comprehended within it.”209 Most fa-
mously, in Ex parte McCardle, the Justices declined to determine
the constitutionality of federal legislation imposing martial law in
the post-Civil War South after Congress repealed the statute
vesting the Justices with jurisdiction over the case.210 Chief Justice
Chase bluntly declared, “Without jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause.”211 By preventing the Justices from
adjudicating McCardle, Congress retained the final say over the
constitutional status of military rule in the South during Recon-
struction. Congress did not vest the federal judiciary with jurisdic-
tion over all cases raising federal questions until the Judiciary Act
of 1875.212
In sharp contrast to such decisions as Ableman, Cooper, and
Boerne, the Supreme Court made no pretense of being the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution when handing down Wiscart v.
Dauchy, Durousseau v. United States, and McCardle. Read in light
of these jurisdictional decisions, Ableman, Cooper, and Boerne hold
only that the Supreme Court has the final say over those constitu-
tional controversies for which Congress has decided to vest the
Supreme Court with the final say. The Supreme Court in Cooper
settled whether Arkansas had to desegregate public schools in the
wake of Brown only because Congress maintained the federal laws
permitting litigants to challenge the constitutionality of state
actions in federal courts.213 Had Congress repealed section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and related measures, state courts during the
1950s would have determined the constitutional status of Jim Crow.
Before 1875, state courts that sustained federal laws or declared
state laws unconstitutional had the final say on those constitutional
208. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (opinion of Elsworth, C.J.).
209. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
210. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868).
211. Id. at 514.
212. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
213. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
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controversies.214 Federal law permitted appeals from state courts to
the Supreme Court of the United States only when the state court
sustained a state law, declared a federal law unconstitutional, or
rejected an assertion of a federal constitutional right.215 In contrast,
the constitutionally mandated Supreme Court of the Confederacy
exercised no constitutional authority because the Confederate Con-
gress failed to pass laws establishing that institution.216
The constitutional law of federal jurisdiction belies the Supreme
Court as the ultimate allocator of constitutional authority, as well
as the Supreme Court as ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning.
Congress dispenses constitutional authority when determining the
scope of federal jurisdiction. The national legislature decided which
national institution determined the constitutional status of military
rule during Reconstruction by stripping the Supreme Court of the
relevant jurisdiction217 and which institution determined the consti-
tutional status of same-sex marriage during the second decade of
the twenty-first century by keeping the relevant jurisdictional rules
on the books.218 Long-standing Supreme Court precedent limits only
how Congress may allocate constitutional authority to the courts.
For example, when Congress cedes constitutional authority to the
national judiciary, the national legislature may not dictate how the
Justices will rule on constitutional questions219 or retain the
capacity to reverse Supreme Court decisions.220 Congress must vest
the Supreme Court with the final say over constitutional controver-
sies when vesting the Justices with jurisdiction over those contro-
versies, but the national legislature determines the constitutional
controversies on which the Supreme Court will have that final say.
The precise power Congress holds over federal jurisdiction has
been the subject of a running constitutional debate for more than
two hundred years. Justice Joseph Story and Professor Akhil Amar
214. See Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512, 517 (1863).
215. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25.
216. See MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY
INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 104-05 (1991).
217. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868).
218. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-97 (2015).
219. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792).
220. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1871). See generally James
S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Deci-
sionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
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maintain that Congress must vest the federal courts with jurisdic-
tion over all questions of federal law.221 Professors James Liebman
and William Ryan assert that Congress must vest federal courts
with “effective” power to review all questions of federal law but that
this may be done without vesting the federal courts with full federal
question jurisdiction.222 Other commentators suggest that Congress
must make at least one federal court available to hear any matter
of federal law.223 In 1861, Senator John Hale of New Hampshire
insisted that Congress had the power to abolish the entire Supreme
Court,224 a position that entails the congressional power to deprive
the Court of all appellate jurisdiction (and more).
A general consensus does exist that federal courts cannot enforce
whatever congressional constitutional obligation exists to vest the
federal judiciary with full federal question jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court does not have the final say over whether Congress
must create a Supreme Court. Justice Story, when urging Congress
to provide the federal court system with jurisdiction over all cases
mentioned in Article III and complaining about the “serious mis-
chiefs ... already arisen” when Congress failed to take his advice,
acknowledged that jurisdiction withholding is not justiciable.225 He
confessed, “This court has no jurisdiction, which is not given by
some statute.”226 Then-representative James Buchanan, when lead-
ing the successful fight in Congress against the repeal of section 25
of the Judiciary Act,227 never hinted in his report defending federal
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions that a federal court
could declare unconstitutional a congressional repeal of that
jurisdiction.228 While Congress has never tested the limits of the
legislative power over federal courts, existing Supreme Court
doctrine empowers elected officials, subject to numerous qualifica-
221. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-35 (1816); Akhil Reed Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.
L. REV. 205, 215 (1985).
222. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 220, at 884-85.
223. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953).
224. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1862).
225. White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, 1015-16 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547).
226. Id. at 1015.
227. See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmen-
tation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 99-100 (2009).
228. See Counter Report Upon the Judiciary, 7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxxi-lxxxvi (1831).
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tions,229 to reallocate constitutional authority by stripping the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts of their jurisdiction over
the vast majority of cases raising constitutional issues. Chief Justice
Melville Fuller declared, “[I]t has been held in an uninterrupted
series of decisions that this court exercises appellate jurisdiction
only in accordance with the acts of Congress upon that subject.”230
The constitutional law of federal jurisdiction confounds persons
seeking the ultimate constitutional authority in the United States.
Judges accept the constitutional authority of elected officials, who
in turn accept the constitutional authority of judges. The Supreme
Court consistently rules that the Justices may declare laws uncon-
stitutional only when federal law gives them jurisdictional permis-
sion.231 These precedents vest Congress with the final say over the
allocation of constitutional authority.232
Members of Congress, when defending federal laws granting the
Supreme Court broad or full jurisdiction over federal questions,
consistently insist that the Supreme Court is responsible for settling
national constitutional controversies. James Buchanan in 1831
maintained that “the General Government would be deprived of the
power, by means of its own judiciary, to give effect ... to the constitu-
tion” if Congress repealed section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.233
These legislative precedents vest the Supreme Court with the final
say on constitutional questions, a power which seems to include
the power to allocate constitutional authority.234 Perhaps some
theoretical solution exists to this apparent chicken and egg problem,
but the best approach may be to acknowledge that constitutional
authority in the United States is shared in ways not captured by
any position elaborated in the debates over judicial supremacy.235
229. See supra Part II.
230. Colo. Cent. Consol. Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138, 141 (1893).
231. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868).
232. See id.
233. Counter Report Upon the Judiciary, 7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxxiii.
234. In 1831, Buchanan endorsed Story’s position that Congress had a constitutional
obligation to vest the Supreme Court with full federal question jurisdiction. Id. at lxxxiv.
235. See MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 121-39
(2013).
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IV. SETTLEMENTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
In 1984, Professor Owen Fiss created a stir when condemning
movements that promote legal settlements through mediation and
arbitration. “Settlement,” he asserted, “is a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised.”236 Professor Fiss opposed alternative dispute resolutions
because he was committed to judicial supremacy. “Adjudication,” he
contended, is a process designed “to explicate and give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.”237
Settlements are particularly problematic because the law of the
parties more likely reflects “imbalances of power” than the law of
the land as articulated by federal courts.238 Professor Fiss main-
tained, “[T]he distribution of financial resources, or the ability of one
party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining
process, and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of
justice that seeks to make the wealth of the parties irrelevant.”239
Proponents of alternative dispute resolution challenge Professor
Fiss’s celebration of adjudication,240 but his observation that settle-
ments undermine judicial supremacy is correct. The Supreme Court
resolves constitutional conflicts only when the parties litigate. When
parties settle their constitutional differences, they determine the
constitutional rules that govern their behavior, even when they
“bargain in the shadow of [constitutional] law.”241 The settlement
agreement between Sharon Taxman and the Piscataway Board of
Education242 left most communities free to determine whether they
236. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
237. Id. at 1085.
238. See id. at 1076.
239. Id. at 1076.
240. For a flavor of the debate, see generally Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five
Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009).
241. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
242. Joan Biskupic, Rights Groups Pay to Settle Bias Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 1997),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/wp112297.htm
[https://perma.cc/QD8X-4RN4]. This example would work better if the settlement occurred
before the Court of Appeals, because the Third Circuit had declared the race-conscious termin-
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have sufficient constitutional reasons to use race when deciding
what teachers to terminate during a recession.243 Had the Supreme
Court weighed in, the judicial majority would have almost certainly
severely curtailed any use of race when school boards lay teachers
off.244 The temporary independent constitutional authority that
school boards exercise in the wake of Taxman may be permanent.
If the constitutional use of race depends on the conditions in a
particular school district,245 then the Supreme Court will never
provide standards to guide districts similar to Piscataway should
the Justices ever adjudicate a case with similar facts to Taxman.
Even if not permanent, the independent temporary constitutional
authority that school boards and other officials exercise is conse-
quential. School boards, state courts, and lower federal courts have
had the final say on whether a particular school district has a
constitutionally sufficient justification for using race when laying off
teachers during the almost thirty years since the Taxman settle-
ment occurred, because the Supreme Court has not subsequently
clarified what constitutes a constitutionally sufficient reason for
using race in the hiring and firing of public school teachers. The
settlement may also have altered the path of constitutional law. By
taking the constitutional decision away from the Rehnquist Court,
which during the 1980s and 1990s never sustained a state affirma-
tive action program,246 the parties to the Taxman settlement may
have placed that authority in the hands of a future Roberts Court,
augmented by another liberal justice, that is more likely to sustain
affirmative action programs.247
The Supreme Court is far more enthusiastic than Professor Fiss
is about alternative dispute resolutions that vest legal authority in
private persons rather than in federal or state judges. Justices who
ation program unconstitutional. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir.
1996).
243. The Supreme Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274
(1986), declared that “[t]his Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is suffi-
cient to justify racial classification,” but did not elaborate on what might constitute a
sufficient justification for using race when deciding which teachers to lay off. Id.
244. See id. at 283-84; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492, 497
(1989).
245. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419-20 (2013).
246. See, e.g., J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
247. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-19, 2421.
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routinely preach judicial supremacy nevertheless also routinely
sustain laws and private agreements that mandate mediation or
arbitration. Supreme Court opinions speak of the “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” and insist that under feder-
al law “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration.”248 Supreme Court Justices sup-
port alternative dispute resolution even when mediation agreements
practically compel persons to waive legal and constitutional rights.
Although “practices such as arbitration and mediation empower
both private individuals ... and nonjudicial actors within the gov-
ernment to resolve disputes that would otherwise be adjudicated by
judges and juries,” Professor Sarah Staszak notes, the Supreme
Court interprets federal law as “preempt[ing] state laws designed to
promote litigation” and as “compel[ling] mandatory arbitration in
lieu of traditional legal hearings, often even in the case of constitu-
tional claims.”249 The Supreme Court in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia
prevented the judiciary from having the final say on disputes over
cable television fees by ruling that federal law preempted state laws
making certain binding arbitrary clauses in contracts unenforce-
able.250 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent recognized that legal authority
was being transferred from judges to private parties.251 She quoted
a New York Times investigation that found, “[b]y inserting individ-
ual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of consumer and
employment contracts, companies [have] devised a way to circum-
vent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action
lawsuits, realistically the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or
deceitful business practices.”252
Professor Fiss was also correct when he emphasized how inequal-
ities of wealth threaten judicial supremacy.253 Judicial supremacy,
248. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
249. SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
RETRENCHMENT 11-12 (2015).
250. See 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
251. See id. at 478 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/V8PH-TG35]).
253. See Fiss, supra note 236, at 1076-78.
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Professor Fiss claimed, is grounded in the judicial capacity to rule
on constitutional principle unbiased by the superior capacity of one
party to make claims based on constitutional principle.254 Constitu-
tional rights that “depend on the outcome of no elections”255 should
not depend on who had the better lawyer or could hire the better
experts. “Judgment aspires to an autonomy from distributional
inequalities, and it gathers much of its appeal from this aspiration,”
Professor Fiss declared.256 Constitutional decision-making in the
United States fails to meet this standard. Professor Fiss admitted,
“Imbalances of power ... distort judgment” because “[r]esources
influence the quality of presentation, which in turn has an impor-
tant bearing on who wins and the terms of victory.”257 Judicial
efforts to compensate for economic disadvantage, Professor Fiss
confessed, “are likely to make only a small contribution toward
moderating the influence of distributional inequalities.”258 When
capacities to litigate influence how Justices interpret constitutional
provisions and settle constitutional conflicts, well-heeled litigants
share with Justices the power to determine the path of constitu-
tional law. Even if Professor Fiss rightly judges that adjudication is
less vulnerable than mediation or arbitration to economic dispari-
ties,259 the impact of wealth on all of these processes transfers
constitutional authority from judges, arbiters, and mediators to
economically powerful individuals and institutions. 
Consider a society committed to giving the judiciary the final say
on all constitutional controversies in which a Board of Litigation
oversees the constitutional litigation process. Before parties make
claims of constitutional wrong in court or even hire attorneys, they
must present their claims to the Board. When the Board approves,
the parties are given substantial resources to pursue their claims.
The alleged constitutional wrongdoer is required to use an attorney
as overworked as the average public defender in the United States
and is forbidden from spending more than a minimal amount on the
defense. When the Board disapproves the lawsuit, the defendant
254. See id.
255. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
256. Fiss, supra note 236, at 1078.
257. Id. at 1077.
258. Id. at 1077-78.
259. See id. at 1076-78.
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receives unlimited resources, and the plaintiff is forbidden from
using any resources that are not mandated by the Due Process
Clause and from hiring a lawyer more competent than the minimum
requirements of the Sixth Amendment. The Constitution may mean
what the Supreme Court in this regime says the Constitution
means,260 but most commentators would like that the Board of
Litigation and the Supreme Court share constitutional authority,
with the Board probably having far more influence on the path of
constitutional law.
Access to justice problems compound the ways in which settle-
ments and wealth disparities undermine judicial supremacy. The
Supreme Court does not have the final say when parties settle
claims of constitutional wrong or when parties do not litigate claims
of constitutional wrong, because they do not know they are victims
of a constitutional wrong, lack the resources to litigate a constitu-
tional wrong, or fear reprisals if they litigate the constitutional
wrong. When parties do not litigate or do not adequately litigate
claims of constitutional wrong, constitutional authority flows from
courts to those parties who have the resources to make or deny
claims of constitutional wrong, litigate claims of constitutional
wrong, and prevent reprisals when they litigate constitutional
wrongs. These access to justice problems are substantial. Professor
Douglas Colbert observes, “four out of five low-income litigants [are]
without counsel in housing, family, and immigration proceedings.”261
Some cash-strapped communities also experience access to justice
problems. Many localities abandon defending Takings Clause claims
against land use regulations because they cannot afford extensive
litigation.262
In the absence of a strong support structure for litigation, the
Supreme Court rarely has the final say on constitutional matters.
Before Congress provided funds for the Legal Services Program,
state and local officials established the constitutional rules regulat-
260. See Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May
3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 133, 139 (1908) (“We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.”).
261. Douglas L. Colbert, Clinical Professors’ Professional Responsibility: Preparing Law
Students to Embrace Pro Bono, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 309, 314 (2011).
262. See Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675, 700-01 (2006).
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ing state welfare policies without much federal judicial input.263 In
the absence of litigants of color with substantial litigation resources,
southern states and private mobs determined the constitutional
status of Jim Crow. The Supreme Court had few opportunities to
protect the rights of persons of color until the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began sponsoring
constitutional attacks on long-standing government practices.264 The
NAACP tended to bring lawsuits only in such border states as
Kansas and Maryland, because Klan activity and other mob violence
in the Deep South suppressed litigation by persons of color.265 The
Supreme Court remained largely on the sidelines when other rights
controversies arose until the national government passed laws that
overcame access to justice problems. Professor Sarah Staszak notes
that “the rights revolution was not just about the passage of land-
mark legislation like the Civil Rights Act, but was also necessarily
fueled by a dramatic expansion of procedural mechanisms, causes
of action, and a deep support structure to enable disadvantaged
groups to get their day in court.”266
The ways in which controversies over the rights of African-Amer-
icans were settled at the turn of the twentieth century illustrate
how access to justice issues influence—and do not influence—the
allocation of constitutional authority and path of constitutional law
in the United States. An African-American community fully capable
of recognizing and litigating plausible claims of constitutional wrong
would not have converted the Waite, Fuller, and White Courts into
the Warren Court. The Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson sus-
tained racial segregation even though the African-American
community in New Orleans was aware of potential constitutional
problems with racial segregation, fully litigated those constitutional
claims, and did not fear reprisals from that litigation effort.267
263. See SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 31 (1990).
264. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 44-70 (1998).
265. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 164 (2004) (“Most civil rights litigation in the 1930s took
place in border states and the peripheral South, because challenging the racial status quo in
the Deep South, even through the courts, remained too dangerous.”).
266. STASZAK, supra note 249, at 210.
267. 163 U.S. 537, 544, 550, 552 (1896). For a good account of the backstory of Plessy, see
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Nevertheless, the Waite Court’s willingness to protect voting rights
in Ex parte Yarbrough and Ex parte Siebold suggests that far more
African-American claims of race discrimination in the voting process
would have been resolved favorably had all African-Americans had
the capacity to engage in the litigation necessary to give the
Supreme Court of the United States the final say over whether they
were unconstitutionally denied the right to vote.268 Federal and
state courts, however racist, were far more inclined to protect the
rights of those African-Americans whose constitutional claims were
finally settled by lynch mobs.
Supreme Court Justices who are vigilant to prevent legislation
that directly reverses judicial decisions269 are more tolerant when
elected officials deny persons the resources they need to litigate
and enforce what may be their constitutional rights. Persons ac-
cused of criminal offenses who are not sentenced to jail have no
right to an attorney.270 Persons bringing or defending civil suits
have no right to an attorney in almost all cases, even when they are
claiming constitutional rights. “[A]n indigent’s right to appointed
counsel” several decisions hold, “has been recognized to exist only
where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation.”271 Defendants in capital cases under certain conditions
have a right to a state-financed psychiatrist272 and may under cer-
tain circumstances have a right to state-financed DNA testing.273
Litigants are otherwise left to their own resources when defending
against criminal charges. Lawyers who do little more than conduct
generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
(1987).
268. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665, 667 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 399
(1879). For a good survey of Waite Court decisions on race discrimination, see PAMELA BRAND-
WEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 129-60 (2011). Similar
claims could be made with respect to White Court decisions declaring unconstitutional state
laws that had the effect of practically reenslaving persons of color. See United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 238, 241, 244-45 (1911).
269. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997).
270. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
271. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442 (2011) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981)).
272. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 86-87 (1985).
273. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63-64 (2009).
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perfunctory investigations and stay conscious throughout the trial
meet constitutional standards for effective assistance of counsel.274
Teachers and scholars of American constitutionalism unfortu-
nately place decisions that deny potential litigants access to attor-
neys, effective attorneys, and the resources they need to fully
litigate claims of constitutional wrong in different constitutional
categories than decisions concerning the allocation of constitutional
authority. Participants in the debates over judicial supremacy focus
on such cases as Boerne v. Flores to the exclusion of such cases as
Gideon v. Wainwright. Persons in the debate over the right to an
attorney in civil cases focus on such cases as Gideon to the exclusion
of such cases as Boerne. Boerne is taught in the constitutional law
classes. Gideon is usually reserved for courses in constitutional
criminal procedure.275 These practices ignore the important connec-
tions between Boerne and Gideon, between cases concerned explic-
itly with judicial supremacy and cases concerned explicitly with
access to justice. Justice George Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama
recognized that the judicial capacity to have the final say over
constitutional controversies depended on all persons being able to
fully litigate their claims of constitutional wrong when he declared,
“left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.”276 A
regime in which one cannot litigate plausible claims of constitu-
tional wrong is not a regime in which the judiciary settles all, or
even most, constitutional controversies.
V. THE REASONS WHY
Justices who loudly trumpet the importance of judicial supremacy
in the American constitutional regime have ideological, legal, polit-
274. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673, 700 (1984); Burdine v. Johnson, 262
F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that sleeping counsel was per se ineffective under the
Sixth Amendment, but that defendants would have to prove specific prejudice when
represented by drunk or high counsel).
275. No Supreme Court decision has ever discussed possible relationships between Boerne
and Gideon. My Westlaw search failed to find a single article that discussed possible
relationships between Boerne and Gideon. No prominent constitutional law casebook excerpts
Boerne and Gideon in the same section or chapter.
276. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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ical, and pragmatic reasons for more quietly ceding constitutional
authority to persons outside of the Supreme Court. Law (and fact)
deference enables Justices to reach what they believe are right
constitutional results without having to overrule precedent. Long-
standing legal practices compel law (and fact) deference in some
circumstances. Justices concerned with political backlash prefer
that other institutions resolve some constitutional issues. Supreme
Court Justices cannot in practice, even if they want to in theory,
have the final say on the vast majority of constitutional controver-
sies that arise in the United States.
Some law deference reflects judicial support for the underlying
legislative or state court decision. The Justices who think partisan
gerrymanders are nonjusticiable reject justiciable constitutional
attacks on legislative apportionments unless race is involved.277
Support for good faith exceptions in cases raising constitutional
questions about the exclusionary rule and federal habeas corpus is
highly correlated with opposition to a broad exclusionary rule and
broad access to federal habeas corpus.278 These examples suggest
Justices support good faith and equivalent rules that require some
deference to “mistaken” state and lower court judgments, because
they do not believe those judgments are mistaken, but they do not
want to overrule—or overrule immediately—the offending Supreme
Court precedent. Professor Neil Siegel notes how Supreme Court
Justices sometimes employ “federalism reasoning and rhetoric both
to temporize and to facilitate constitutional change” in what they
believe are favorable constitutional directions.279 At least some
judicial conservatives may have thought the “full and fair” hearing
standard in Stone v. Powell was a “way station”280 on the path to the
judicial abandonment of the exclusionary rule.
Legality explains other instances of law deference. For example,
long-standing Supreme Court precedents hold that the motives or
justifications that government actors have or give for some official
277. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 492-93 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-17 (1995).
278. See generally McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347-51, 354 (1974).
279. Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in
Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 91 (2014).
280. Id. at 93.
1600 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1549
action cannot convert a government decision that the Supreme
Court may not reverse into a government decision that the Supreme
Court may reverse.281 This line of decisions, which date from 1810,
prevent the Court from considering, for example, whether governors
who refuse to assist the federal government enforce laws mandating
standardized drivers’ licenses do so because they disagree with
Supreme Court decisions holding the federal law constitutional or
because they simply believe that state personnel have more impor-
tant tasks to perform.282 The unanimous decision in United States
v. Nixon strongly suggests that the Justices sincerely believed that
the Constitution vested the Senate with the power to determine the
processes for impeaching federal judges283 and jury nullification,
discussed in the previous paper, which is deeply rooted in American
constitutionalism.284
Politics explains some law deference. The Supreme Court has, or
is thought to have, limited political capital. Bickel urged the
Justices to avoid making decisions that exposed “the inner vulnera-
bility, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsi-
ble and has no earth to draw strength from.”285 While Justices
almost never admit publicly that political considerations constrain
them, some public decisions and private correspondence suggest the
Justices had anticipated or taken Professor Bickel’s advice when the
political stakes were too high or the problem of backlash too great.
One year after Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland
claimed “[o]n the Supreme Court of the United States has the con-
stitution of our country devolved this important duty”286 of settling
constitutional controversies, he “escaped on the construction of the
[state law]” when asked to determine whether Virginia was con-
stitutionally empowered to imprison all sailors of color while their
ships were docked in Virginia harbors.287 Chief Justice Marshall
281. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 228 (1971); see also United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
282. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 182, at 1643-45.
283. 506 U.S. 224, 233-34 (1993).
284. See Graber, supra note 19, at 168.
285. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 184 (1962).
286. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
287. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Sept. 26, 1823), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 338, 338-39 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998).
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avoided making a constitutional decision in that instance because
he was “not fond of butting against a wall in sport.”288 Justice
Samuel Miller provided one explanation for McCardle and related
Supreme Court decisions during the Civil War and Reconstruction,
in which the Court refrained from ruling on constitutional issues,289
when he privately bragged that he “did more to prevent interfer-
ence” with administration policies “than perhaps any other member”
of the Court.290 The Supreme Court in 1955 found a phony excuse to
avoid settling the constitutional status of laws banning interracial
marriages because “[i]n view of the difficulties engendered by the
segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to duck this ques-
tion for a time.”291
Practical realities also compel law and fact deference. Supreme
Court Justices cannot be present to give authoritative commands to
all admissions officers on the extent to which they may consider a
particular applicant’s race. The Justices do not sit at the dinner
table to advise rejected applicants on whether their equal protection
rights were violated. This gives admissions officers the final say for
all practical purposes over the precise weight given to the race of a
particular applicant. Similarly, police officers are largely immune
from Supreme Court scrutiny. The nine Justices cannot advise every
police officer on whether contemplated searches are constitutional
or inform all persons searched by a police officer whether the police
officer violated their constitutional rights. The legality of most police
searches in the United States is determined by the police officer’s
belief that the search was constitutional, the searched person’s
belief that the search was constitutional,292 or the police officer’s
capacity to present the relevant facts to superiors or courts in ways
288. Id. at 338.
289. See generally Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864) (finding that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to review the jurisdiction and proceedings of a military tribunal);
Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512 (1863) (finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
review a decision of the highest court in New York).
290. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 89
(1939).
291. Christopher W. Schmidt, Essay, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 203, 223 (2008) (quoting the Certiorari Memorandum authored by Justice Harold
Burton’s law clerk in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891
(1955), reaff ’d on remand, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956)).
292. Or the searched person’s inability to challenge an unconstitutional search, which, in
effect, makes the police officer the final arbiter of the legality of that search.
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that make the search appear constitutional. The Supreme Court
may provide broad outlines (“do not admit or reject applicants solely
because of their race”) that structure the literally billions of
interactions between persons and government officials every day,
but the fine tuning (how much weight to give race) that settles
constitutional matters, for the most part, is done by the parties
involved rather than nine very distant Justices.
CONCLUSION
The common claim that the United States is governed by an
imperial judiciary rests on two foundations. The first is the coverage
thesis. On this view, the Supreme Court resolves almost every
question of political importance in the United States. Tocqueville set
forth the canonical account of the coverage thesis when he famously
asserted, “[s]carcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion.”293 The second is the supremacy thesis. In that view, the
Supreme Court, as a matter of law and practice, has the authority
to settle every constitutional question that arises in the United
States. Chief Justice Earl Warren set forth the canonical account of
the supremacy thesis when he asserted in Cooper v. Aaron that “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since [Marbury v. Madi-
son] been ... a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system.”294 Combined, the coverage and supremacy theses
suggest judicial absolutism. If all political questions became judicial
questions and the federal judiciary provided the final answers to all
judicial questions, then the Supreme Court would be authorized to
determine the standards that guide all of American politics.
Most challenges to the imperial judiciary focus on the supremacy
thesis. Critics claim that the Supreme Court, as a matter of practice
and law, has not had and should not have the authority to settle
every constitutional question that arises in the United States.
Empirical work details how some constitutional policy making is a
consequence of dialogues between Justices and other governing
293. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 280.
294. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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officials.295 Not infrequently, governing officials perform solos. The
Supreme Court played almost no role settling the constitutional
issues raised by American expansionism or the processes by which
national officials are impeached.296 Normative works question
whether the Constitution requires courts to have the final word on
constitutional matters. Some Americans champion a department-
alism approach in which all governing officials determine for them-
selves the best interpretation of the Constitution.297 Mark Tushnet
urges elected officials to “tak[e] the Constitution away from the
courts.”298
The coverage thesis has come under fire. Scholars who blithely
cite Tocqueville fail to notice that, at the time Tocqueville was
writing, very few political questions were resolved into judicial
questions. During the 1830s, congressional votes and presidential
vetoes settled the most important constitutional questions dividing
the nation.299 Professor Frederick Schauer documents a similar
pattern in contemporary politics. His study compares the agenda of
the Rehnquist Court to those issues that Americans during the
1980s and 1990s thought most important. Professor Schauer con-
cludes that, for the most part, the Supreme Court resolves only
issues of peripheral interest to most Americans.300
This and the companion study of how contemporary constitutional
doctrine allocates constitutional authority further weakens both the
coverage thesis and the supremacy thesis.301 The Supreme Court
295. See SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND
WAR POWERS DEBATES, at ix-x (1992); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRE-
TATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 8 (1988); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REV. 577, 653-54 (1993).
296. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 141 (1999); Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation
of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERI-
CAN EXPANSION, 1803-1898, at 83, 89 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds.,
2005).
297. See JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 10 (1984)
(arguing that constitutional interpretation is not solely within the judiciary but rather an
interactive system of mutual oversight and combined interpretation); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Essay, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 106 (1998).
298. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, at x-xi
(1999).
299. Graber, supra note 37, at 486, 503, 534-35.
300. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 63-64.
301. See generally Graber, supra note 19. The next two paragraphs summarize the conclu-
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does not claim to resolve every political or even every constitutional
question that excites Americans. The political question doctrine
allocates to national officials the authority to resolve many ques-
tions of constitutional law. The Supreme Court refrains from
intervening when governing officials or ordinary citizens give consti-
tutional reasons for not exercising what the Justices insist are their
constitutional powers or constitutional rights. Governing officials
and private persons are free to settle their constitutional disputes
on whatever constitutional basis they think right, regardless of any
Supreme Court precedent on the matter. The Supreme Court’s com-
mitment to concrete judicial review vests many governing officials
with temporary authority to resolve constitutional questions. On
some matters, the Justices defer in part to constitutional judgments
made by other governing officials through the use of various good
faith or reasonableness rules. The Justices allocate substantial
authority over constitutional controversies by deferring to legisla-
tive, administrative, or lower court fact findings. Jury verdicts of not
guilty are unimpeachable and nearly unimpeachable otherwise,
even when strong evidence exists that jurors have ignored constitu-
tional instructions or made unconstitutional use of racial and other
factors when making their decisions. Whether the Supreme Court
may prevent Congress from stripping the federal judiciary of all
appellate jurisdiction or from abolishing the Supreme Court alto-
gether remains an open constitutional question.
Contemporary constitutional doctrine provides far more opportu-
nities than proponents and opponents of judicial supremacy realize
for governing officials other than Supreme Court Justices to exercise
independent constitutional authority. Existing precedents vest
governing officials other than Supreme Court Justices with the final
say on all controversies that are nonjusticiable or where Congress
has not provided federal courts with jurisdiction. The rules for
standing and bringing appeals to the Supreme Court enable federal
and state elected officials, state and lower federal judges, and pri-
vate persons to exercise temporary constitutional authority during
the often lengthy time between when a constitutional controversy
erupts and when the Supreme Court is able to weigh in on that
controversy. Police officers and state courts take advantage of
sions of both essays.
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precedents mandating fact deference by tailoring their testimony
and findings in ways that undermine what they believe are mistak-
en Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional rights of persons
suspected of crime. Existing constitutional law leaves governing
officials free to act on their constitutional beliefs when they think
the Supreme Court has construed their powers or rights too broadly.
Judicial supremacy understood as the judicial power to allocate
constitutional authority does not describe the American constitu-
tional regime more accurately than judicial supremacy understood
as the judicial power to settle all constitutional controversies.
Congress allocates constitutional authority when creating the feder-
al judiciary and vesting federal courts with jurisdiction over some
or all constitutional questions. Clear constitutional commands, poli-
tics, and practical realities guarantee that governing officials other
than Supreme Court Justices will exercise constitutional authority
even when Congress has provided the Court with jurisdiction over
the constitutional issue in question. Long-standing constitutional
practices provide persons outside the Supreme Court with numerous
opportunities to make meaningful constitutional decisions. The
Sixth Amendment’s provision for jury trials,302 as well as Article
III’s case or controversy requirement,303 can be judicially tinkered
with only at the margins. Powerful political actors often compel
Supreme Court Justices to make decisions limiting judicial power
to settle constitutional controversies. The Marshall Court probably
made a strategic decision in Durousseau v. United States when the
Justices, in a young Republic dominated by Jeffersonians who were
skeptical of judicial power, announced that they could exercise
appellate review only when Congress had vested the Court with
such jurisdiction by statute.304 Numerous political actors settle, help
settle, or temporarily settle most constitutional controversies be-
cause Supreme Court Justices lack adequate supervisory capacities.
Supreme Court Justices can rarely determine constitutional facts
accurately and cannot mandate that governing officials outside the
Court exercise what the Justices believe are constitutional powers
302. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
303. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
304. See Graber, supra note 30, at 47.
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when those governing officials believe the Supreme Court has
mistakenly interpreted the Constitution.
The judicial allocation of constitutional authority suggests that
coherence is as great a constitutional problem as countermajoritar-
ianism.305 The literature on the imperial judiciary presents the
United States as a regime largely run by nine Justices who are
politically unaccountable. This allocation may be undemocratic, but
the Justices more often than not pursue a relatively consistent
course of decisions.306 The ways in which contemporary constitu-
tional doctrine allocates constitutional authority suggests that
multiple decision makers influence how controversies over the
meaning of constitutional provisions are settled in the United
States. This constitutional pluralism is a more democratic allocation
of constitutional authority but risks constitutional chaos as different
constitutional authorities settle controversies on the basis of
radically different constitutional principles. Sometimes, constitu-
tional pluralism promotes constitutional values. That elected
officials in Congress and in the states may construe their constitu-
tional powers more narrowly and constitutional rights more broadly
than the Supreme Court provides a floor for constitutional rights
and permits local experimentation. In other cases, constitutional
pluralism threatens the rule of law.307 One consequence of the
Supreme Court’s use of good faith or reasonableness rules in such
cases as Stone v. Powell is that state courts must use relatively
liberal standards to judge the constitutionality of police searches
when a criminal defendant is fortunate enough to have a lawyer
astute enough to make the proper objection at trial; however, state
courts may use relatively conservative standards to judge the con-
stitutionality of the same police searches in habeas corpus appeals
when less experienced counsel representing a less fortunate defen-
dant fails to make the proper constitutional objections at trial.
Having one institution determine the relevant constitutional facts
305. See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425, 428
(2005); Mark A. Graber, Review Essay, Introduction to Law’s Allure Symposium: Law and
Politics—An Old Distinction, New Problems, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1025, 1026 (2010).
306. Though not recently. See Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of
Partisan Conflict, 50 IND. L. REV. 141 (2016).
307. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND
KILLS POLITICS 152-74 (2009).
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and another determine the relevant constitutional law is a recipe for
practices that neither institution thinks have any merit. Often this
division of constitutional labor makes constitutional rights depend
on whether a police officer is a good liar or on the trier of fact’s
propensity to believe police perjury. More often, judicial doctrines
that permit wealth disparities and access to justice to influence the
path of constitutional law cede constitutional sway to economically
powerful individuals and corporations while weakening the power
of Justices to settle controversies involving less fortunate persons.
This incoherence may be the price of a very rough constitutional
pluralism. Rather than dispense constitutional authority formally
by clear rules that specify what institutions have responsibility for
which constitutional controversies and provisions, the American
constitutional order dispenses constitutional authority informally
through a set of rules and practices that enable numerous political
actors to influence how constitutional controversies are settled. As
time goes to infinity, the Supreme Court may have the final say over
what every provision in the Constitution means. Nevertheless,
constitutional powers and rights at any particular time depend on
constitutional decisions made by private persons, state and federal
legislatures, state and federal administrators, state courts, and
lower federal tribunals. Americans may play at judicial supremacy
only because constitutional doctrine throughout American history
provides them with numerous opportunities to game the system
when they know or suspect that particular Supreme Court rules are
not to their liking.
